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A

mong the more surprising developments reported in the months since
the attacks on the World Trade Center is
the revelation that terrorists and their
sympathizers may have been using one of
America’s greatest strengths — its tradition of philanthropy — to undermine

And then there is a less subversive
but no less deceptive type of front. The
New York Times reported a few years ago
that a nonprofit organization supposedly
consisting of “concerned restaurant owners” who were opposed to an anti-smoking
ordinance, was in fact created and funded
by an arm of the tobacco industry.
In the wake of the September 11
attacks, the problem of charitable front
groups has reemerged in a particularly
dangerous manner. The Bush administration has declared that it suspects
several Muslim nonprofit groups operating in the United States, including the
Benevolence International Foundation,

often anonymously. Fidelity’s Charitable
Gift Fund, with $2.6 billion in assets in
2001, now raises more in private funds
than any group except the Salvation
Army. It distributed $574 million in
grants to charities in 2000. The size and
clout of the commercially associated
donor-advised funds have put them
under the national media spotlight in the
wake of the September attacks and the
administration’s subsequent scrutiny of
Islamic charities.
Fidelity announced that it would not
distribute grants to organizations that the
government identifies as suspect. Fidelity’s
move was no surprise, considering that
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national peace and security. The weapons
have not been airplanes or shoe bombs,
but charitable dollars.
The methods of terrorist groups apparently involve exploitation of nonprofit laws
and abuse of the permissive rules that govern commercially related donor-advised
funds – the charities associated with brokerage houses that allow people to make
deposits into special charitable accounts,
receive an immediate tax deduction on
their gifts, and then recommend which
nonprofit groups should receive grants
from the accounts.
The problem of charitable front
groups is not entirely new. There have
been occasions in past decades when
nonprofit organizations were exposed
after trying to conceal the true nature of
their financial support or the true nature
of their objectives. In 1939, for example,
the German and Hungarian War Veterans
Post applied for a nonprofit charter in the
state of New York, but was denied the
charter based on the strong suspicion
that it was a Nazi Bund dedicated to
undermining the government. There also
have been allegations that American
intelligence agencies in past years used
nonprofit organizations in other countries as front organizations to support
covert operations.
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Global Relief Foundation, and Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development,
of being fronts for terrorists committed to
violent activities here or abroad.
These allegations, if proved true,
raise serious questions about the way the
government oversees charitable organizations. If the groups in question are indeed
terrorist organizations masquerading as
charities, how did they manage to get
charters, tax exemptions and, in at least
one case, a church designation from the
Internal Revenue Service? Did the IRS
simply take at face value the groups’
descriptions of themselves as legitimate
charities? If so, post-September 11 realities
may require that we think differently
about the way we charter nonprofit
groups and exempt them from taxation.
A related issue is whether the donoradvised funds run by investment houses
have thoroughly investigated those nonprofit organizations that receive grants
from their contributors. As charities,
donor-advised funds are not subject to
the stricter reporting requirements and
other regulatory controls that apply to
private foundations, and therein lies the
funds’ special vulnerability.
One reason the issue is so important
is that donors use these funds to funnel
billions of dollars to charities each year,
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the brokerage company lists some of the
suspect charities, including the Global
Relief Foundation and Benevolence
International Foundation, as grant recipients. Fidelity did not report the amount of
money that it has distributed to these
organizations in the past.
Nothing malicious has occurred, as far
as the funds themselves are concerned.
With tens of thousands of donors and a vast
number of recommended charities,
Fidelity’s Charitable Gift Fund, Schwab’s
Fund for Charitable Giving, Vanguard’s
Charitable Endowment Program, and other
such funds would face an enormous challenge if they tried to verify the legitimacy of
every charity favored by donors. Certainly
the investment houses could not have been
expected to screen charities against government lists of suspected terrorist fronts
before the lists themselves were issued.
Still, the vulnerability of donor-advised
funds to potential abuse is significant.
The funds have provided only modest
direction to donors regarding available
information about recommended grant
recipients. They have not thoroughly

investigated the uses of their charitable
grants. Nor have they offered much aid to
unwitting supporters of alleged terrorist
groups by helping them identify inappropriate grant recipients.
In explaining their operating style,
the commercially run donor-advised
funds have always emphasized the virtues
of promoting the free flow of charitable
dollars. But such freedom can come at the
expense of thorough monitoring.
The fact that Fidelity had to develop a
post hoc policy regarding the suspected terrorist fronts is consistent with that
approach. For instance, the Justice
Department froze assets of the Quranic
Literacy Institute in 1998 following a very
public allegation that the group was connected to the Palestinian terrorist group
Hamas. Yet two years later Fidelity listed
the group as one of its grant recipients.
Despite assertions to the contrary, it
does not unfairly limit donors’ freedom of
choice to argue that the funds should take
greater responsibility for their giving and
exercise more control over disbursing the
gifts they receive. Donors who want to
avoid a fund’s scrutinizing actions should
donate directly to the tax-exempt organization of their choice – and incur the risk
that the IRS may withdraw the taxdeductibility of their gift if the recipient is
found to be a terrorist group.
The fact that groups such as Fidelity
have begun monitoring government lists of
suspected terrorist organizations is a positive development. However, using these lists
alone could prove to be unfair to nonprofit
groups that are subsequently cleared of
wrongdoing. And the lists would not reflect
the fact that information about misconduct
by groups often becomes available before
formal government action is appropriate.
Indeed, relying exclusively on government watch lists is not a substitute for
exercising precautionary diligence. The
Wall Street Journal, for example, observed
that journalists publicized the FBI’s investigation of the Holy Land Foundation’s
connection with the militant Palestinian
group Hamas as early as 1994, and some
donors no doubt ceased giving to that
foundation as a result of their concern.

Nonetheless, the Holy Land Foundation’s
tax return reflects that it raised $13.3 million in donations during the tax year 2000.
Outside the context of terrorism,
observers have expressed fears that the
funds’ failure to monitor the use of grants
may have allowed some donors to subvert
the law by directing gifts to groups that
benefited them personally, including their
own private foundations.
While it is unreasonable to assume that
funds affiliated with brokerage houses can
prevent every instance of wrongdoing by
donors or grant recipients, the funds could
— and should — be doing more to prevent
abuses. They should routinely provide
research findings to donors about the
integrity and financial efficiency of the
organizations they are supporting. In addition, they should more aggressively assess
donors’ recommendations, using the best
possible information on charities’ operations. They should discourage donors from
giving anonymously. And, to the extent
they have not already done so, the funds
should make the names of donors available
to law enforcement officials.
Many have argued that brokerageaffiliated donor-advised funds serve their
commercial self-interests better than they
serve charities, donors or the public interest.
As long as the problem seemed limited to
self-dealing by some donors and mismanagement by some funds at the fringes of the
nonprofit world, it was not a matter of
extraordinary concern. However, now that
the problem of terrorist front organizations
has emerged, the stakes are higher. The
way government monitors the activities of
tax-exempt organizations, and the way the
donor-advised funds conduct their charitable giving, is due for change.
Parts of this essay first appeared as an opinion-editorial in
the Chronicle of Philanthropy, published January 24,
2002.
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